ABSTRACT Database forensics is a domain that uses database content and metadata to reveal malicious activities on database systems in an Internet of Things environment. Although the concept of database forensics has been around for a while, the investigation of cybercrime activities and cyber breaches in an Internet of Things environment would benefit from the development of a common investigative standard that unifies the knowledge in the domain. Therefore, this paper proposes common database forensic investigation processes using a design science research approach. The proposed process comprises four phases, namely: 1) identification; 2) artefact collection; 3) artefact analysis; and 4) the documentation and presentation process. It allows the reconciliation of the concepts and terminologies of all common database forensic investigation processes; hence, it facilitates the sharing of knowledge on database forensic investigation among domain newcomers, users, and practitioners.
I. INTRODUCTION
The integration of apps on mobile devices, software used on Internet of Things (IoT) devices, along with the need to improve functionality in numerous business applications, continue to motivate interest in the area of database forensics. Coupling this information with increasing interest in residual data in legal environments [1] , [2] , necessitates research in this relatively understudied area. Database forensics is a branch of digital forensics that uses database content, metadata, log files, data files, and memory data to create timelines, establish relationships and recover relevant data [3] .
The numerous pieces of input that potentially impact a digital forensic investigation involving a Database Management System (DBMS) is inherently more complex than that of a traditional file system [4] , particularly in an IoT environment that is likely to comprise a wide range of heterogeneous devices. For example, in an IoT deployment in battlefields (also referred to as Internet of Battlefield Things or Internet of Military Things), we would need to collect evidential data from a wide range of sensors installed on military vehicles, cameras (e.g. IP-based CCTV feeds), road side units, etc. These data are also likely to be in different formats (e.g. proprietary formats) and of different sizes. While files are often abstracted as streams of bytes, a database is a collection of data where data elements are related to one another. Hence, the process or procedures that are used in a digital investigation directly impact the results of the examination. Selecting investigative processes that do not fit, potentially, leads to incomplete and/or loss of evidence [5] . This incomplete or missing data may lead to indecisive consequences and give invalid conclusions. In other words, evidence that is not acquired in a forensically sound manner may risk being inadmissible in a court of law [6] .
Thus, several database forensic investigation models have been proposed in the literature. The proposed models range in focus from specific scenarios to generic applications and, in doing so, provide a variety of details as a result. The diversity in scenarios and resulting details perceivably make it challenging, or even complicated, particularly for newer forensic investigators, to adopt accurate or proper investigation models. Due to the lack of a generic/common database forensic investigation process model [7] , [8] , this study provides a structure, referred to as the Common Database Forensic Investigation Process (CDBFIP), which unifies, facilitates, and shares knowledge of database forensic investigation processes among database users and practitioners. Unifying these processes in a single abstract diagram increases the knowledge available to users, newcomers, and practitioners. Additionally, it reduces the complexity and ambiguity of the investigation. This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents works related to this research. Section III describes the actual development process of our CDBFIP based on the Design Science Research (DSR) methodology. While it would be ideal to evaluate CDBFIP using real-world IoT cases, it is challenging to obtain access to such cases partly due to the sensitive nature of forensic investigations. Therefore, in Section IV, we use a set of nine database forensic models to validate CDBFIP. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V with recommendations for possible future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The database forensics domain uses database content and metadata to identify, collect, preserve, reconstruct, analyse and document evidence of crime. Owing to the complexity and multidimensional nature of DBMS, database forensics has received little attention from researchers [3] - [5] , [7] , [9] , [10] . Existing works in database forensics can be viewed from three perspectives, namely: technology (tools, algorithms, and methods, etc), investigation process (e.g. identification, collection, analysis, and presentation) and the database forensic dimension (destroyed dimension, compromised dimension, changed dimension, etc) [11] .
A number of studies have been conducted on Oracle databases; these works encompass specific Oracle investigation tasks, activities, processes, techniques, concepts and terminologies. For instance, a forensic investigation model was developed by Wong and Edwards [12] that consists of generic steps to discover information about an operation performed on the database [9] . A Log Miner tool was developed by Wright [13] that allows a Data Base Administrator (DBA) or forensic analyst to reconstruct actions taken on a database [11] . Seven practical investigation forensic models were developed by Litchfield [14] . The author addressed information available from redo logs, dropped objects, authentication, flashback, and a recycle bin. Wright and Burleson [15] published a forensic textbook on Oracle RDBMS; however, the book was written as a guide and intended for database administrators [9] . A block diagram to collect evidence was developed by Tripathi and Meshram [16] that is based on a series of practical methods developed to analyse database tampering in an Oracle database [14] .
In addition, a number of practical studies have been carried out on Microsoft SQL Database Server (MSSQL Database Server). These studies covered database investigation tasks, activities, processes, techniques, concepts and terminologies. A methodology for an SQL Server Forensic Analysis was proposed by Fowler [10] ; the proposed methodology involves four processes, namely, investigation preparation, incident verification, artefact collection, and artefact analysis, dealing specifically with an SQL server database [4] , [11] . A Detection and investigation model was developed by Son et al. [17] to detect the database server and collect data. Fowler et al. [18] also proposed an approach to gather and analyze data in practical and real-world scenarios. Their approach covers technical concepts that investigators use to investigate compromised databases. An approach for detecting the tampering of forensic evidence in an SQL server was proposed by Basu [19] ; the proposed technique shows how tampering can be detected and how to localize the affected data but does not provide tamper-prevention measures [20] , [21] . A methodology to distinguish suspicious transactions from legitimate transactions among the SQL Server artefacts, in order to eliminate irrelevant data, was proposed by Khanuja and Adane [22] . This methodology specifically considered the investigation processes, technology, and database dimension in its solution.
Relatively few studies have been conducted that investigate a MySQL database in reference to database forensics. A study by Khanuja and Adane [3] did develop a framework for MySQL database forensic analysis. The proposed framework focuses on discovering malicious tampering in My SQL database. The authors further highlighted the database server artefacts that were employed for the investigation.
It is worth noting that a model for detecting database inconsistencies was proposed by Fruhwirt et al. [23] ; nevertheless, there was no knowledge discovered for multiple log files or cache for further analysis [24] . To address the limitations of the model proposed by Frühwirt et al. [24] , another model was proposed by Frühwirt et al. [25] to reconstruct the basic SQL statements from InnoDB's redo logs. However, this model focuses on the Data Manipulation Language (DML) statements and ignores the Data Definition Language (DDL) statements. To address situations where the user is unavailable or where the user is under investigation, Lawrence [26] proposed a technical investigation method to gain access to users' MySQL database without user consent. According to Adedayo [27] , several works have been conducted in digital forensics. However, they largely focus on cloud forensics and smartphone forensics [28] - [45] . They do not directly mention ddatabase forensics. While certain aspects of database forensics have been investigated over the years [7] , [11] , [46] , [47] , there has been minimal research into the development of a standard/common approach for unifying investigation tasks and activities among investigators.
This paper aims to unify the investigation process of the database forensics in one platform called CDBFIP. It considers as abstract base for our previous paper [48] that proposed a metamodel (modelling language) for database forensics. Also, we developed a metamodel (modelling language for mobile forensics to categorise and structure mobile forensics domain [49] . Therefore, this paper addresses the variety of the investigation process for whole database forensics domain.
III. METHODOLOGY
This study embraces a Design Science Research (DSR) methodology to design the proposed process artefact, hereafter referred to as the Common Database Forensic Investigation Processes (CDBFIP) [50] , [51] . DSR is a research methodology that is used to create new and persistent artefacts for a special problem domain that enables analytics to be examined [52] . This particular implementation of DSR concentrates on Information Technology (IT) artefacts that significantly impact the application domain. According to March and Smith [52] , the creation of DSR can be explained in terms of four kinds of artefacts which include the following: constructs that organize the language to identify problems and solutions, models that use this language to describe problems and solutions, methods that define processes that offer assistance on how to answer problems and the final artefact instantiations which are defined as combinations of constructs, models, and methods. The DSR lifecycle embraces repetitious assessment of produced artefacts. The execution of the DSR life-cycle necessitates that the building and assessment of the artefact are completed before the artefact is offered to users. The design science process includes six steps, which are illustrated in Fig. 1 [47] , [53] . 
A. IDENTIFY AND SELECT DATABASE FORENSIC INVESTIGATION MODELS
Several database forensic models were discussed and analyzed in the literature review. Model selection for this research was based on coverage factors that were identified in previous research [47] , [54] . A wide coverage of perspectives, concepts, and terminologies that are broadly applicable is required to fulfill the aim of proposing a common investigation process for database forensics. Using coverage metric quickly provides an indication of sourced model applicability. The model is said to have a high coverage value, if the model can cover all database forensic perspectives (i.e., a general model). The model has a reduced amount of coverage value, FIGURE 2. Method for proposing a common investigation process for database forensics, adapted from existing research [47] , [53] .
if the model only describes a specific database forensic perspective, such as the technology perspective (i.e., a specific model). Therefore, models that cover at least two database forensic dimensions, two databases forensic investigation processes, and at least one database forensic investigation technology (tool, method, or algorithm) were identified and selected for developing CDBFIP. However, models that covered only specific database forensics perspectives (i.e., one or two perspectives) were identified and selected for validation purposes. For example, a System and Method for Investigating a Data Operation Performed on a Database Model, which is proposed by Wong and Edwards [12] , covered three perspectives of the database forensics domain. In addition, the SQL Server Forensic Analysis Methodology approach that is proposed by Fowler [10] covered the three database forensics perspectives. Table 1 displays thirty-eight (38) database forensic models that were identified and selected from forty (40) existing database forensic models. Fig 2 displays the models that cover both generic and specific database forensic perspectives. Group ''A'' refers to models that cover the all database forensic perspectives. Group ''B'' refers to models that cover only two database forensic perspectives. Group ''C'' refers to models that cover a single database forensic perspective.
Step 3.2 concentrates on recognizing and extracting investigation processes from the eighteen (18) selected database forensics models.
A database forensic investigation process was derived from eighteen (18) selected models. During the course of the extraction, certain criteria [48] , [55] were adhered to in order to identify a relevant and proper investigation process. The criteria used to identify the database forensic investigation processes are as follows: C1: Titles, abstracts, related works and conclusions were excluded; the investigation process was either extracted from the diagram or from the main textual model.
C2:
The investigation process must have a definition or activity; the investigation process must have a definition or activity to recognize the purpose, meaning, and functioning of the process.
C3: Irrelevant investigation processes not related to conducting database forensics were excluded.
C4: Include explicit and implicit investigation processes from models.
The above criteria were utilized in an attempt to avoid any missing or random process selections. For example, the investigation process model to reveal malicious database activities for an Oracle database was proposed by Wong and Edwards [12] . Their solution consists of four investigation processes, namely: Suspending database operation, collecting data, reconstructing a database, and restoring database integrity. Another model was developed by Wright [13] to discover and analyze intruder activities in an MSSQL server database. Wright [13] provided a solution that consists of four investigation processes, namely: Verification, Evidence Collection, Timeline Creation, and Media Analysis. In addition, two investigation processes were extracted from [56] , which were Identification and Collection, to identify and collect volatile and non-volatile data.
Additionally, four investigation processes have been extracted from Fowler's [10] model to identify, verify, collect and analyze MSSQL server database incidents: Investigation preparation, Incident verification, Artefact collection, and Artefact analysis. In addition, two investigation processes were extracted from a model to detect and extract malicious relations among tables that were proposed by Lee and Choi [57] : Preparation of database environment and data extraction. The other three investigation processes, Data acquisition, Financial data analysis, Final report and court submission, were proposed by Choi et al. [58] to detect fraud statements. Furthermore, Oliver [9] proposed three investigation processes to extract, search and restore metadata that are used for investigative purposes: Metadata extraction, Restoration, and Searchability. In addition, a process investigation model was introduced by Son et al. [17] for enterprise environments. The investigation process involves three steps: server process detection subsequent to an incident report, followed by data collection and an investigation on the data collected.
In addition, a tamper detection model was proposed by Tripathi and Meshram [16] to introduce the concept of tamper detection for digital evidence stored in a database. Thus, the two investigation processes highlighted in [16] [7] to investigate a compromised database management system. Generally, it consists of two main investigation processes: the Identification process and the Collection process. In addition, another process model was proposed by Khanuja and Suratkar [61] to collect, preserve and analyze database metadata against database attacks. Three main investigation processes were proposed by Khanuja and Suratkar [61] 
: Collection of metadata, Preservation of metadata, and Analysis of database attacks.
The model proposed by Frühwirt et al. [62] is designed to reconstruct database events to detect intruder activities, via the following: a Collection process to gather evidence by replicating sources and a Reconstructing evidence process that is necessary to rebuild user activities and detect malicious activities. Similarly, an investigation process model was proposed by Adedayo and Oliver [5] to reconstruct and analyse database activity using log files via the Reconstruction process and Analysis process. Finally, Wagner et al., [4] proposed a database forensic analysis model to reconstruct database activities through internal structure carving, via Reconstructing volatile artefacts, and recovering database schema.
Therefore, as an output of this section, fifty-four (54) investigation processes were identified and extracted from these eighteen (18) database forensic models. The proposed investigation processes are interlinked activities and tasks to achieve the goal of the Database Forensic activity. Thus, the next step merged and extracted investigation processes that were grouped based on their activities and meaning. Table 2 presents the extracted database forensic investigation process from the eighteen (18) models.
B. MERGING AND GROUPING OF THE EXTRACTED DATABASE FORENSIC INVESTIGATION PROCESSES
The fifty-four (54) extracted database forensic investigation processes are merged and grouped together based on similar activities and concepts [63] , [64] . All investigation processes having similar activities and concepts are organised, merged and grouped into separate collections. The first grouping scrutinized processes that broadly dealt with investigation preparation, incident identification, and verification. The initial merging and grouping of the extracted database forensic investigation processes is demonstrated as follows.
The Suspension of Database Operation in the model of Wong and Edwards [12] isolates the database server from the users in order to capture database activities, while the Verification process in the model of Fowler et al. [18] verifies and checks incidents, isolates the database server, and confirms the incident. In addition, the Identification process in [56] deals with disconnecting database servers from the network in order to capture volatile data. Likewise, the purpose of the Investigation preparation and Incident verification in [10] is to identify and verify database incidents through a preliminary investigation, prepare forensic workstations and forensic toolkits to respond to incidents and then disconnect the database server. Furthermore, the Preparation of the Database Environment proposed in Lee et al's [57] used to prepare the investigation environment and to obtain necessary permission to access the database and execute required commands. Additionally, the Data Acquisition process necessitates securing the location of evidence and extracting evidence that relates to a crime or an incident [58] . Another process of interest is Server Detection which is used to identify and detect the victim database server [17] . Furthermore, the Setup Evidence Collection Server process described in [16] is used to prepare the investigation environment to store incidents, while the Identification process described in [3] identifies relevant MySQL database files (text files, log files, binary files) and utilities.
Similarly, Susaimanickam [59] proposed a model for the Examination Preparation process, which is used to detect database incidents by cutting off the network, configuring the investigation environment, identifying policies, preparing the proper tools and also informing decision making.
In addition, Fasan and Oliver [60] proposed a model for Determining Database Dimension and Acquisition Method, which is used for identifying which dimension of the database has been attacked or hacked. Once this has been achieved, the proper acquisition methods for that dimension are then identified. An identification process model is proposed by Beyers [7] that is aimed at the database forensic layers, methods and environment. Therefore, fourteen (14) investigation processes have been organized, merged and grouped based on their activities and congruent concepts. Table 3 presents the first group of organized, merged and grouped investigation processes.
The second grouping inspected processes from the data collection perspective. Wong and Edwards [12] proposed a model for the data collection process aimed at assembling data metadata and intruder activity. Similar processes are introduced by Fowler et al. [18] that include Evidence Collection to collect evidence from the victim database server and an Evidence Collection process proposed by Litchfield [56] to collect volatile data from compromised database servers. Fowler [10] proposed an Artefact Collection model (Fowler, 2008) that is used to collect volatile and nonvolatile MSSQL Server database artefacts such as log files, data files, a data cache, transaction logs, and log files.
Additionally, a data Extraction process is proposed by Lee et al. [57] to extract data on relationships that connect columns in database tables. In addition, the Data Acquisition process, proposed by Choi et al. [58] , has similar activities designed to extract fraud data from a database server. Additionally, the Metadata Extraction process offered by Oliver [9] to extract the metadata of the database dimension is used to determine who was authorized to perform a certain action. In addition, the Data Collection process presented by Son et al. [17] is subdivided into two stages that consist of a stage dedicated to selectively files and another stage that focuses on collecting entire files. In addition, a file collection model was introduced by Tripathi and Meshram [16] to collect Oracle files from specific locations and move them to the evidence collection server for further investigation. Furthermore, the Artefact Collection process was proposed by Khanuja and Adane [3] to collect and extract database files and metadata from compromised MySQL Server databases. Similarly, Susaimanickam [59] proposed a Collection process as a sub-process of physical and digital examination to collect physical and digital data. Moreover, the Collection of Volatile Artefacts andNon-Volatile Artefacts processes were proposed by Fasan and Oliver [60] to collect database files, log files, log transactions and also volatile artefacts such as data caches, redo log, and undo log.
Similar to the Artefact Collection process presented by Fowler [10] , an Artefact Collection process was proposed by Khanuja and Adane [22] . The Collection process introduced by Beyers [7] allows one to collect and extract suspected database management system data and move it to a secure area for further forensic investigation, and the Metadata Collection process proposed by Khanuja and Suratkar [61] allows one to collect detailed multiple logs of SQL, MySQL and operating systems.
Implicitly, the preservation process is mentioned by Wong and Edwards [12] under the Collecting Data process to protect the integrity of data by hashing collected data. It is also mentioned in Fowler's [10] model under the Artefact Collection process to prevent any modification of collected data. In addition, Choi et al. [58] mentioned implicitly as ''Secure data sources'' under the Data Acquisition process. In [9] , it was mentioned as an integrity measure to provide an exact copy of the original data. In the model proposed by Susaimanickam [59] , it was described as the main preservation process in the Physical & Digital Examination process. Explicitly, it was mentioned in [60] along with the Collecting Metadata process as the preservation of metadata. Thus, the preservation process was grouped with the collection process. Therefore, sixteen (16) investigation processes have been organized, merged and grouped based on their activities and meaning. Table 4 presents the second grouping of organized, merged and grouped investigation processes having similar activities and concepts.
The third grouping broadly focused on database reconstruction, artefact analysis and overall forensic analysis. For example, an Analysis process has been mentioned in several models. In the model of Wong and Edwards [12] , it was used to Reconstruct a Database and Restore Database Integrity after collecting data to rebuild intruder activities along with revealing malicious actions and restoring database consistency. In addition, Fowler [18] mentioned it as different names in two models. For example, in the model of Folwer et al. [18] , it was mentioned as part of the Timeline Creation and Media Analysis processes, while Fowler [10] described it as part of the Artefact Analysis process to reconstruct timeline events and analyse malicious activity. In addition, Choi et al's. [58] model referred to the analysis process as Financial Data Analysis and used it to reveal fraudulent transactions. Other models referred to the analysis process as Restoration and Searchability [9] , where Son et al's., [17] model referred to it as the Investigation on Data Collected process. Furthermore, Khanuja and Adane's [3] model mentioned it explicitly as Artefact Analysis. It is mentioned implicitly as part of the Reconstruction phase along with the physical and digital examination process in [59] . Other models referred to the Analysis process as Forensic Analysis [22] , Analysing Database Attacks [61] , Reconstructing Evidence [62] , Reconstruction [5] , and Reconstructing Volatile Artefacts [4] .
Some models highlighted certain investigation processes explicitly or implicitly. For example, the Reconstruction process was mentioned explicitly in several models [4] , [5] , [12] , [62] , while it was mentioned implicitly under the Artefact analysis process in [10] and also mentioned implicitly in Choi et al. ' s [58] model under the Financial Data Analysis process. In addition, it is mentioned as the Restoration process in [9] , which used it to refer to the recreation of data that have been (partially) destroyed or only partially recovered by a forensic capture process. Moreover, it is mentioned implicitly under the Physical & digital examination process in [59] . Therefore, it will be merged and grouped along with the Analysis process because it is part of the process that is used to rebuild timeline events during the analysis process. Therefore, seventeen (17) investigation processes have been organized, merged and grouped based on their activities and concepts. Table 5 presents the third grouping of organized, merged and grouped investigation processes with similar concepts and activities.
An additional refinement of the identified processes examined the similarities from the broad perspective of documentation which would include presentation and reporting. The Documentation and Presentation process was mentioned by Susaimanickam [59] to document and present whole investigation stages and submit the results to the court. In addition, Choi et al. [58] offered it as a final report and court submission, whereas Khanuja and Adane [3] mentioned it as a final forensic report. Table 6 displays the fourth group of organized and merged investigation processes.
In the summary of this section, fifty-four (54) extracted database forensic investigation processes have been organized, merged, and grouped based on their activities and concepts. Four forensic investigation groups have been highlighted. Every group has similar processes in meaning and activities, regardless of actual naming. Every group has a common investigation process amongst other processes. Therefore, the common investigation process for every group will be proposed in the next section.
C. PROPOSED COMMON INVESTIGATION PROCESS FOR DATABASE FORENSIC EXAMINATION
Four forensic investigation groups have been highlighted in Section 3.3 based on similarities in concept and activities. This section aims to propose a common investigation process for every group. The mapping process has been adopted to propose common investigation processes. The investigative process, which has a higher frequency in the group, will be a candidate and be referred to as a common investigation process. From these phases, four common database forensic investigation processes were derived: Identification process, Artefact Collection & Preservation, Artefact Analysis, and Documentation and presentation process. Since some of these processes overlap, it was necessary to take into account the activities performed in each of the investigative processes and to not rely solely on naming conventions [63] , [64] .
The mapping process is adopted to select the more frequent investigation process for every forensic investigation group. Identification process was identified as an investigation process by fifteen (15) investigation processes in Group 1. It appears three times in three models [56] , [3] , [7] . Table 7 shows the mapping process of forensic investigation in Group 1.
In addition, Artefact Collection was identified as an investigative process by sixteen (16) investigation processes in Group 2. It appears three times in three models [10] , [22] , [3] . Table 8 shows the mapping process of forensic investigation in Group 2.
The Artefact analysis process was identified as a common investigation process among seventeen (17) investigation processes in forensic investigation Group 2. It appears two times in two different models [10] , [3] . Table 9 shows the mapping process of forensic investigation in Group 3.
In addition, the Documentation and Presentation process was identified as a common investigation process from forensic investigation Group 4. This process has rarely been mentioned by researchers. Therefore, the author suggests using this process due to its generality. Fig 3 displays the proposed common investigation process for a database forensic investigation.
In summary, four (4) common investigation processes have been proposed based on their frequency or generality. Three common investigation processes have been proposed based on their frequency (Identification, Artefact Collection, and Artefact Analysis). However, the Documentation and Presentation process has been proposed based on its generality. It is more general than other investigation processes in the forensic investigation. The next section will combine the various definitions of database forensic investigation processes and reconcile them to the abstract definition.
D. RECONCILIATION OF INVESTIGATION PROCESS DEFINITIONS
Explicit definitions are important in science. Precise definitions help to give a clear meaning of concepts. Differences between definitions are reconciled in this phase.
In choosing or synthesizing, the common investigation process definitions to be used are shortlisted in this phase. If there is a conflict in the definition between two or more sources, then the definitions are reconciled based on common definitions and environment applicability. Some models explicitly omit defining their concept; in such cases, they do not provide any input to the reconciliation process. Therefore, this section aims to harmonize and reconcile the investigation process shortlisted definition. The same reconciliation approach process has been implemented in previous research [47] , [53] . Similar definitions are reconciled and harmonized into one abstract definition.
For example, the proposed Identification process defined by Litchfield [56] ''deals with disconnecting the database server from the network to capture volatile data as well as prepare forensic environment and forensic techniques to moved captured data in'', whereas [3] defined it as ''Identification process used to identify MySQL database files (text files, log files, binary files) and also identify MySQL utilities''. On the other hand, Beyers [7] defined it as ''Identification process for preparing database forensic layers and forensic methods, as well as preparing forensic environment (found environment, clean environment)''. Therefore, the definition of Litchfield's [56] is specific to isolating the database server along with preparing the forensic environment and forensic techniques, whereas the definition by Khanuja and Adane [3] is too specific to deal with preparing MySQL database files and utilities. However, the definition of Beyers [7] is similar to [56] . Thus, Byers's definition and Litchfield's definition will be reconciled and harmonized in one abstract definition:
''Identification process is the first Database Forensic investigation process that is used to prepare a clean database forensic investigation environment and trust forensic techniques, as well as allow the investigation team to isolate the database server enough from the network to prevent users from tampering and capturing volatile and non-volatile data''.
In addition, ''Artefact Collection'' was defined by three different researchers. Fowler [10] defined it as ''collection of volatile and non-volatile MSSQL Server database artefacts such as log files, data files, data cache, transaction logs, and log files''. Whereas, Khanuja and Adane [3] defined it as ''collection and extraction of database files and metadata from a compromised database''. In addition, Khanuja and Adane [22] defined it as a ''collection of volatile and nonvolatile MSSQL Server database artefacts such as log files, data files, a data cache, transaction logs, and log files''. From an analysis viewpoint, [10] definition is too specific to MSSQL server database, whereas [22] defined the Artefact Collection process from two perspectives. The first definition focused on non-volatile artefacts, whereas the second definition was borrowed from Fowler [10] . Consequently, a harmonized and reconciled version of this definition is as follows: ''Artefact Collection process is the second Database Forensic investigation process that is used to collect and preserve volatile and non-volatile artefacts from the suspect database using trust forensic techniques''.
Additionally, the Artefact Analysis process has two definitions. Fowler [10] defined it as ''analysing authentication and authorization events, as well as configuring and versioning artefacts. Furthermore, analysing activity reconstruction and data recovery artefacts, which make up the largest grouping of artefacts'', whereas Khanujha and Adane [3] defined it as ''analysing all data that are acquired through the incident verification and collection phases''. Clearly, [10] definition is brother than [3] . Thus, we harmonize and reconcile these definitions as ''Artefact Analysis process is the third Database Forensic investigation process that is used to analyze acquired data, activity reconstruction and data recovery using special forensic techniques to reveal who is tampering, when and where the tampering happened and how the tampering happened.'' Finally, the Documentation and Presentation process was defined by Susaimanickam [59] as ''Documents and presents whole investigation stages, and submit the results to the court''. However, the authors reconciled it as ''Documentation and Presentation investigation process is the fourth Database Forensic investigation process that is used to document and present the investigation stages and submit the results to the court''.
In summary, the proposed common investigation process definitions have been reconciled and harmonized into abstract definitions. The next section concentrates on comparing the proposed common investigation processes against other existing database forensic models to validate and verify the completeness and generality of proposed common investigation processes.
IV. VALIDATION OF PROPOSED COMMON INVESTIGATION PROCESSES
The version of the proposed common investigation process will now be validated and improved to make it complete and coherent.
The derived processes, of the proposed common investigation process, are validated and compared to processes from other similar existing domain models [79] - [81] . For this purpose, we used a set of nine popular and widely used database forensic models in a validation set. Every investigation process, in each of the models, can be appropriately derived from an investigation process. Where required, we modified the proposed investigation process to ensure that it can represent all models in the validation set. This validation ensures that the database forensics domain can be represented in each of the models in the validation set. Where applicable, proposed investigation processes were modified to ensure that every model can be represented. No processes were changed, e.g., Identification-process, Artefact Collection-process, Artefact Analysis process, and Documentation & Presentation process in the proposed common investigation processes.
A. COMPARISON AGAINST EFFICIENT MODEL FOR DETECTING DATA AND DATA SCHEMES TAMPERING FOR THE PURPOSE OF VALID FORENSIC ANALYSIS
A detection model, proposed by Azemović and Mušić [72] , aimed at detecting database system tampering. It offered an efficient approach to providing audit logs for transaction processing systems that can effectively and efficiently detect tampering. SQL coding and cryptographic techniques such as strong cryptographic hashing were used to provide authentication codes on collected data. Thus, this model implicitly provides collection process. the collection process is used to extract data from log files and secure the validity of the collected data. Therefore, the proposed common investigation process ''Artefact Collection'' covered the existing investigation process in the model ''Collection process''.
B. COMPARISON AGAINST METHODS FOR EFFICIENT DIGITAL EVIDENCE COLLECTION OF BUSINESS PROCESSES
Three techniques were proposed by Azemović and Mušić [73] to collect digital evidence from database systems: Triggers, Log file backup, and Replications. Triggers are very powerful elements in a database system that, if used properly, can be very helpful in detecting data modifications. In addition, the log file backup concept can be used on a regular basis for collecting and keeping digital evidence of users' activity. Additionally, the replication method is a set of technologies for copying and distributing data and database objects from one environment to another; it then synchronizes between databases to maintain consistency. Therefore, this model offered a Collection process to collect evidence using three methods against user behavior. Thus, the proposed Artefact collection process has covered the Collection process.
C. COMPARISON WITH ASSEMBLING METADATA FOR DATABASE FORENSICS
A collection process model has been offered by Beyers et al. [82] to locate the key evidence and maintain the integrity and reliability of the evidence. This model describes a database forensic method that transforms a DBMS into the required state for a database forensic investigation. The method segments a DBMS into four abstract layers that separate the various levels of DBMS metadata and data. Therefore, the proposed common investigation process ''Artefact Collection'' covered the existing investigation process ''Collection process'' in this model.
D. COMPARISON AGAINST ORACLE FORENSICS PART 2: LOCATING DROPPED OBJECTS
The model offered by Litchfield [83] allows the investigator to recover evidence directly from the data files of the compromised server, although an attacker may drop objects.
Several Oracle views and tables assist the investigator in locating dropped objects such as OBJ$, SOURCE$, IDL_UB1$, IDL_CHAR$, and RECYCLEBIN$ tables. Therefore, the proposed investigation process ''Artefact analysis'' has been covered by the Recover evidence process that is offered in this model. In addition, the activities of this process, such as reconstructing events and timelines, are covered as well.
E. COMPARISON AGAINST ''ON THE COMPLETENESS OF RECONSTRUCTED DATA FOR DATABASE FORENSICS''
A specific reconstruction process was offered by [84] to rebuild deleted relations or deleted records from the database to introduce evidence against database incidents. A reconstruction algorithm is used through a reconstruction process to allow the investigators to provide evidence against database modifications. Thus, this process and its activities were enclosed by the proposed investigation process ''Artefact Analysis''.
F. COMPARISON AGAINST DATABASE TAMPERING AND DETECTION OF DATA FRAUD
Analysis process was proposed by Gawali and Gupta [85] to detect and analyze malicious activity. Therefore, the forensic detection algorithm and forensic analysis algorithm have been offered in this model to detect corruption events and determine when and where database tampering occurred. The outcome of this model has covered the proposed investigation process ''Artefact Analysis''.
G. COMPARISON AGAINST ENRICHING FORENSIC ANALYSIS PROCESS FOR TAMPERED DATA IN DATABASE
A forensic analysis process for tampered data in the database was offered by Abhonkar and Kanthe [68] to detect and analyze database tampering. The Tiled Bitmap Algorithm was used to reveal when the tampering occurred and what data were altered. The outcome of this model covered the proposed investigation process ''Artefact Analysis'' with respect to activities and tasks.
H. COMPARISON AGAINST AN APPROACH TO EXAMINING THE METADATA AND DATA OF A DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
This process model was proposed by Beyers et al. [75] to conduct a forensic examination on a DBMS. A Preparation process was offered in this model. The investigator prepares the forensic examination environment, for example, setting up the Ubuntu operating system and PostgreSQL DBMS, and also prepares the forensic comparison tool, which can be used by the investigator to reveal database tampering. Therefore, the preparation process was covered by the proposed common investigation process Identification process.
I. COMPARISON AGAINST FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF DATABASE TAMPERING
The forensic analysis process model of database tampering was proposed by Pavlou and Snodgrass [86] to analyze corruption events in database systems. Several forensic analysis algorithms were introduced in this model and are to be applied after detecting a database intrusion in order to answer questions regarding when and where tampering occurred. Therefore, the forensic analysis process that was proposed in this model, along with the activities, has been covered by the proposed common investigation process ''Artefact Analysis''.
In summary, the proposed common investigation processes for database forensics was validated against nine existing database forensic models. The proposed common investigation process covers the investigation processes that are derived from the compared models. Table 10 displays the proposed common investigation process in comparison to the database forensic models.
V. CONCLUSION
The escalating dependency of IoT devices to retain and manipulate data stored in databases emphasizes the need to develop an in-depth understanding of the nuances associated with conducting a database forensic investigation (Kebande and Ray, 2016; Teing et al., 2017) . This need will be more pronounced as IoT becomes the norm in both civilian and military settings, such as Internet of Battlefield/Military Things.
In this paper, we identified fifty-four (54) investigation processes that were extracted from eighteen (18) database forensic models. These processes were then grouped and refined based on common objectives to identify mutual investigation processes for the database forensic domain. This analysis resulted in the Common Database Forensic Investigation Processes (CDBFIP). Based on a thorough investigation of identified processes and models, the CDBFIP reveals that the database forensic investigation process has four common processes: identification, artefact collection and preservation process, artefact analysis process, and documentation and presentation process. We then used nine existing database forensic investigation models to validate the completeness of the CDBFIP model. Future work will include examining the concepts and relationships in each of the identified processes in the CDBFIP by applying a software engineering approach known as a metamodel, as well as evaluating the CDBFIP using real-world IoT datasets. Future work will also investigate the application of probabilistic and measurement science techniques into specific IoT database extraction solutions. The idea is to start to be able to quantify confidence in terms of data relevance, origination and tool extraction performance. We will also be seeking out opportunities to implement and evaluate the proposed CDBFIP in a real-world IoT infrastructures, which will allow us to validate and refine the model. 
